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The Anatomy of Financial Crises
ABSTRACT
A financial crisis is a disturbance to financial markets,
associated typically with falling asset prices and insolvency
among debtors and intermediaries, which spreads through the
financial system, disrupting the market's capacity to allocate
capital. In this paper we analyze the generation and propagation
of financial crises in an international setting. We provide a
perspective on the danger of a serious disruption to the global
financial system by comparing the last full—fledged financial
crisis —thato the 1930s —withconditions prevailing today.
Our definition of a financial crisis implies a distinction
between generalized financial crises on the one hand and isolated
bank failures, debt defaults and foreign—exchange market
disturbances on the other. We represent this distinction in
three sets of linkages: between debt defaults; and between
exchange—market disturbances and bank failures.
In both the 1930s and 1980s, the institutional environment was
drastically altered by rapid change in foreign exchange markets,
in international capital markets, and in the structure of
domestic banking systems. Our comparative analysis underscores
the critical role played by institutional arrangements in
financial markets as a determinant of the system's vulnerability
to destabilizing shocks.
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Much as the study of disease is one of the most effective ways
to learn about human biology, the study of financial crises
provides one of the most revealing perspectives on the functioning
of monetary economies. Indeed, epidemiological metaphors like
fever and contagion feature prominently in the literature on
financial crises. Rinancial crises, like contagious disease,
threaten not only the host organism, namely the financial market,
but the entire economic environment in which that host resides.
There exists a voluminous historical literature concerned with
episodes labelled financial crises.1 Yet the usefulness of much of
this literature is limited by the absence of any definition of the
phenomenon under consideration and hence of a minimal structure
around which historical observation can be organized.2 This
criticism is not limited to the historical literature, since recent
theoretical analyses of financial crises are uniformly deficient in
this same regard. While no single definition may be appropriate to
all purposes, any work on financial crises should proceed on the
basis of an explicit statement of meaning. Since our purpose in
this paper is to provide a perspective on the present and
prospective danger of a serious disruption to the global financial
system, which we propose to explore bycomparingthe last full—
fledged financial crisis —thatof the 1930s —withconditions
prevailing today, we adopt the following definition. A financialcrisis is a disturbance to financial markets, associated typically
with falling asset prices and insolvency among debtors and
intermediaries, which ramifies through the financial system,
disrupting the market's capacity to allocate capital within the
economy. In an international financial crisis, disturbances spill
over national borders, disrupting the market's capacity to allocate
capital internationally.
This definition suggests an agenda for research, of which the
following questions form only a part. What are the distinguishing
features of disturbances which give rise to financial crises'7
Rather than the nature of the disturbances, is it the financial
system's response that differentiates crises from perturbations to
financial markets9 What is the mechanism through which a
disturbance specific to a single market is generalized to the
entire system? In particular, what are the roles of asset prices
and solvency problems in the processes of generalization and
propagation? Row are the market's allocative capacities disrupted,
and what are the implications of this disruption for the course of
the crisis itself?
Our definition implies a dstinctiort between generalized
financial crises on the one hand and bank failures, debt defaults
and foreign—exchange market disturbances on the other. T}-iis
distinction is the presence of linkages, which are represented
schematically in Figure 1.These linkages within the body economic
give the essential anatomy of financial crises.
Consider two examples which play a leading role in our
historical analysis. Defaults on sovereign bonds, if sufficiently





Disturbanceswidespread and disruptive, impede the ability of the bond market to
allocate capital across countries. But if these defaults are not
accompanied by bank failures (if in Figure 1 the linkage labelled
"I" is interrupted), there may exist alternative channels, notably
bank loans, through which the capital market's allocative functions
may be carried out. Debt default need not give rise to financial
crisis. But if, on the contrary, debt default heightens the
commercial banks' susceptibility to failure, the danger of a
generalized crisis is intensified. To take another example, an
anticipated devaluation may threaten the banking system if
depositors liquidate their accounts in an effort to avoid capital
losses on their overseas assets (an example of the linkage labelled
"V") but if they hold government securities instead, this linkage
is broken and exchange—market difficulties need not be associated
with financial collapse. Clearly, the extent and speed of
transmission along these linkages depend on institutional
arrangements in financial markets, including any institutionalized
responses of policy—makers.
In this paper, we focus on the generalization and propagation
of financial crises in an international setting. Ideally, these
issues of generalization and propagation are studied historically:
while all serious disturbances threaten the stability of financial
institutions, it is only from the comparison of historical episodes
during which different institutional arrangements prevailed that
generalizations about the fragility or resilience of monetary
economies can be derived. By analyzing the contrasting
institutional arrangements of the 1930s and 1980s, we hope to
Lfidentify configurations which render the international financial
system particularly susceptible to collapse.
Our analysis of the generalization of financial disturbances
underscores the critical role played by institutional arrangements
in financial markets as a determinant of the system's vulnerability
to destabilizing shocks. In both the 193Os and l9BOs, the
institutional environment was drastically altered by rapid change in
foreign exchange markets, in international capital markets, and in
the structure of domestic banking systems. But the implications of
institutional changes have not all been similar. In the earlier
period, they generally worked in the direction of heightening the
system's vulnerability to shocks; recently, however, some have
tended to work in the opposite direction. Our review of the course
of crises suggests that the banking system and the linkages by which
it is connected to the rest of the financial sector play a pivotal
role in the propagation of crises. Our analyses highlight the
importance of two sets of factors in the process of propagation:
asset—market linkages running from debt defaults and exchange—market
disturbances to the stability of the banking system (linkages I and
V in Figure 1), and the role of economic policy in blocking these
linkages and thereby insulating the banking system and the
rnacroeconomy from threats to their stability.
5I. The International Financial Crisis of' the 1930s
A. The Environment
The 1920s were marked by three sets of developments which
increased the international financial system's susceptibility
to destabilizing shocks: flux in the foreign exchange market, rapid
institutional change in the banking system, and dramatic shifts in
the volume and direction of international lending. Each set of
developments had its immediate origins in the dislocations
associated with World War I.
Foreign Exchange Markets
The war and its aftermath marked the end of the classical gold
standard. Most countries initially succeeded in maintaining their
gold reserves and customary exchange rates by withdrawing gold coin
from circulation and embargoing bullion shipments. But as
hostilities dragged on and were financed through the issue of money
and bonds, pressure mounted in foreign exchange markets. The (lerman
and Austrian exchanges collapsed by 1918. The British and French
rates were propped up by American intervention but depreciated with
the termination of support in 1919. The postwar inflationary boom,
the reparations tangle and deficit finance of reconstruction all
wreaked havoc with national efforts to peg the domestic—currency
price of gold.
Policymakers then confronted the question of the appropriate
level at which to stabilize exchange rates. The history of
subsequent efforts to reconstruct the system of fixed parities is
familiar: Britain restored sterling's prewar parity in 1925
following a period of deflation; France opted against reversing half
6a decade of inflation, pegging the franc price of gold at five times
the prewar level; G-ermany and other countries experiencing
hyperinflation established new currency units; and Latin American
countries reestablished gold standard parities in conjunction with
budgetary reforms and newly independent central banks.4
The characteristics of the reconstructed gold standard added
to the strains on the financial system. Paramount was the problem
of misalignment, starting with the pound sterling, the traditional
linchpin of the monetary mechanism. Due to high wages and to
changes in the direction of trade, Britain's restoration of the
prewar parity rendered the pound overvalued and difficult to defend
with the Bank of England's slender reserves. Keynes (1925)
estimated sterling's overvaluation at 10—15 per cent.In
conventional accounts, an undervalued French franc figures also
among the misaligned currencies.5 Misalignment was related to the
problem of maldistributed gold reserves, which came to be
concentrated in the United States and France. This maldistribution
gave rise elsewhere to complaints of a "gold shortage", which
induced countries to expand on prewar practice and supplement gold
reserves with foreign deposits. The growth of foreign deposits
rendered the reserve currencies increasingly vulnerable to
destabilizing shocks.6 Each of these difficulties reflected the
failure of governments to coordinate their choice of exchange rates
and to harmonize their monetary policies. Ultimately, the
consequences of this failure would be far reaching.6-
7International Lending
The impact of the war on patterns of international lending and
borrowing was eciually profound.7 The 1920s marked the rise of the
United States and decline of Britain as external creditors. The
transfer of business from London to New York, initiated by wartime
closure of the London market to foreign borrowers and by the Liberty
Loan campaign in the United States, was reinforced following the
conclusion of hostilities by informal capital controls in the UK and
abundant savings in the US. Before the war, Britain's foreign
assets roughly matched the combined total of the remaining creditor
countries, while the US was a creditor of negligible importance. In
the 1920s (with the exception of 1923, when transfers to Europe were
depressed by the Ruhr invasion), lending by the US, especially to
countries outside the British Empire, consistently exceeded that by
Britain.
The other side of this coin was rapidly mounting indebtedness
in Central Europe and Latin America. Loans to Europe were used to
finance the reconstruction of industry and infrastructure, the
purchase of imported inputs and the provision of working capital.
At the same time, the growth of lending can he understood as a
response to the need to recycle German reparations in much the same
way that OPEC investment in the US, in conjunction with US lending
to LDCs, recycled oil revenues in the 1970s.5 Loans to Latin
America, in contrast, reflected favorable publicity and growing
awareness of economic prospects in developing regions.9 Table 1
summarizes the direction of US and British lending. American
lending was widely distributed, going most heavily to Europe (where
8TABLE 1
U.S.arKi British Lx1ir in the 1920s
U.S.Lending Abroad,by Region
(millions of dollars)
Europe Canada LatinImerica FarEast
192)4 526.6 151.6 187.0 96.1
1925 629.5 137.1 158.8 141.7
1926 484.0 226.3 368.2 31.7
1927 557.3 236.14 339.7 151.2
1928 597.9 1814.9 330.1 130.8
1929 1142.0 289.7 175.0 51.5
British Investment in Goverruient aridMunicipal Securities
(millions of pounds)





Sources: For the U.S., Department of Coninerce (1930);
for Britain, Royal Institute of International Affairs
(1937).
9TABLE 2
Anrnl Growth Rates ofRealGDP, Industrial Production and Exports




Exports Foreign Debt as
Industrial in US Percent of
GDP Production Dollars Exports
Germany 1.7 5.0 9.9 6.6
Austria 2.7 6.3 14.0 77.5
Hungary 7.1 —0.4 5.9 123.2
Australia —0.4 4.1 —3.8 112.5
Canada 6.3* 8.8 —1.1 46.2
Argentina 5.7 5.2 4.8 141.8
Brazil 7.2 14.6 —1.6 66.3
Costa Rica 0.2 1.6 3.1 95.11
Chile 10.8 0.0 5.8 101.7
Colombia 7.5 14.5 11.6 55.7
Honduras 5.6 6.8 20.2 143.3
El Salvador 1.7 5.9 12.14 105.14
Guatla 5.5 3.0 _3.l4 514.0
Note:European figuresexcludereparations. An asterisk indicates
1926—29. For Australia, industrial production is proxied by
manufacturing production at constant prices.
Sources: Latin Americanfigurescomputed from Thorp (19814),
Appendix Table 14.European figures computed from Mitchell
(1976). Canadianfigures computed fromUrquhartand
Buckley (19614).Australian figures computed from
Butlin (1985).
10Germany was the leading debtor in absolute terms) and then to Latin
America and Canada; British lending was directed predominantly
towards the Empire, especially at the end of the decade.
Then, as recently, there was much discussion of the soundness
of foreign loans, embellished by tales of loan pushing, excessive
commissions, corrupt administration, and squandering of funds.
Indeed, placing much of the business in relatively inexperienced
American hands may have increased the market's tendency to fund
risky projects.1° It is important to note, therefore, that the
macroeconomic performance of the debtors, and the consequent growth
in their ability to service external debt, was more than respect.—
able, and in the Latin American case rather impressive, during this
period of large—scale foreign lending (1925—29). With the exception
of Costa Rica and El Salvador, real GDP in those Latin American
countries considered in Table 2 increased at then historically
unprecedented rates in excess of five per cent per annum. Except
for Brazil, Guatemala and (to a lesser extent) Costa Rica, the same
is true of exports, despite a persistent decline in the prices of
primary products. Initially, the ratio of debt service to exports
(excluding reparations) remained manageable.0-
Thus, in the 1920s as in the 1970s, foreign lending was
associated with expanding trade and rosy prospects, at least in the
short run, for economic growth in the borrowing regions. Whether
the loans were sound in the sense that export receipts would prove
adequate to service them is essentially the question whether it was
realistic to assume that the growth rates and financial stability
(e.g., absence of real interest rate shocks) of the 1920s would
11persist. The answer is surely more obvious with hindsight than it
was at the time.
Banking Structure and Regulation
These changes in the direction of foreign lending were
accompanied by equally profound developments in the structure and
regulation of commercial banking. Following the lead of the United
States, which had created the Federal Reserve System in 1914, in the
1920s many countries either established central banks or gave them
added independence, in Latin America in conjunction with visits by
US economic experts, in Central Europe as a condition of League of
Nations stabilization loans.11 One function of these central banks
was to act as lender of last resort, although as we shall see there
was considerable variation in the effectiveness with which they
carried out this role. In a number of countries monetary reform was
accompanied by new banking regulations patterned on the TJS model.
In Chile, for example, a law of September 1925 established a
"Superintendencia de Bancos" charged with inspecting the books of
banks and publishing a statement of their position annually. Banks
were prohibited from extending individual loans in excess of ten per
cent of the sum of paid—up capital and reserves and required to
observe minimum capital requirements which differed by city size and
liability composition. Since there was considerable variation in
the appropriateness of the US model, these reforms varied in their
efficacy and implications for the stability of national banking
systems.
A number of countries including Germany and Poland established
publicly owned or controlled agricultural credit and mortgage banks
12which engaged in all forms of deposit and industrial banking and
expanded rapidly.12 Their implications for the stability of the
financial system are not clear: on the one hand, public banks for
political reasons sometimes extended loans for risky undertakings
which did not attract private banks; on the other, the nentral
authorities were particularly disinclined to let public enterprises
fail.
A further feature of the development of banking structure in
the 1920s was a pervasive amalgamation movement. While the
immediate incentive for amalgamation was often savings on
administrative costs, another advantage was the greater facility
with which risk could be diversified and stability ensured through
the dispersion of loans over different regions and sectors of the
economy. Although present earlier, the amalgamation movement in
commercial banking accelerated after World War I, spreading from
England and Wales to Latin America, Hungary, Poland and Greece. In
Germany and Czechoslovakia, large banks increasingly acquired
control of their smaller counterparts, while in the US, restrictions
on branch banking were circumvented through such mechanisms as the
securities affiliate.
Along with the spread of the securities affiliate, financial
innovation in the 1920s took the form of the adoption of
"investment" or "industrial" banking on a national scale in the
Succession States of what had been the Austro—Rungarian Empire. In
English—speaking, Scandinavian and Latin American countries,
intermediaries specialized in deposit banking, soliciting money on
deposit and extending short—term advances to commerce and industry.
13The alternative of investment banking, which entailed long—term
loans to industry, had traditionally prevailed in Central Europe.
When the Succession States created new banking systems in the wake
of World War 1, they naturally emulated Austrian and German
practice. Given the specialization of industry and agriculture in
the newly partitioned Central European states, the fate of the
banks' loan portfolios was tied to the fortunes of narrow industrial
or agricultural markets. When a particular crop or industry was hit
by the Depression, the shock to the banking system would prove
severe.
B. The Crisis and its Management
Our analysis of the financial crisis of the 1930s highlights
two factors: first, the singular importance of linkages running from
debt defaults and exchange market disturbances to the instability of
banking systems; second, the critical role of policy in interrupting
these linkages, thereby insulating the banking system and the
macroeconomy from threats to their stability.
Exchange Market Disturbances
The first indication of serious financial distress was
exchange—rate depreciation by primary producers starting in 1929.
While misalignments within the North Atlantic community may have
played some role in early exchange—market difficulties, the most
disruptive pressures originated on the real side, notably in markets
for agricultural commodities and primary products. o long as US
import demands and foreign lending were maintained, these pressures
remained tolerable. But in 1928—29 the indebted countries of
1L+Central Europe, Latin America and Oceania were subjected to dual
shocks. First, the Wall Street boom both reflected and induced
portfolio shifts by US investors, choking off American capital
exports: after peaking in the summer of 1928, they fell by 46 per
cent within a year (see Table 1).Next, commodity exports declined
precipitously following the U.S. cyclical downturn commencing in the
summer of 1929 (see Table 3). Primary—producing countries were
seriously affected (as shown in Table 4), since the U.S. accounted
for more than 40 per cent of the primary—product consumption of the
15 leading industrial countries.
The exchange rate and the external debt were directly linked
through the government's reserve constraint. Gold and foreign—
exchange reserves could be allocated either to debt service or to
merchants and currency dealers who, under gold standard statutes,
could demand gold for export. In principle, borrowing countries
could have chosen to default on their external debts while defending
the gold standard, to let their exchange rates go while maintaining
debt service, or to default and depreciate simultaneously.
Initially, they chose to sacrifice the exchange rate and honor the
debt. One might speculate that policymakers viewed debt as even
more sacrosanct than the gold standard, although that is doubtful in
view of the frequency of default in the 19th century (matched only
by the frequency of suspensions to convertibility). In fact, their
motives were pragmatic: while default automatically precluded
additional foreign borrowing, depreciation had less impact on
credit—worthiness. It was even suggested that, insofar as
depreciation stimulated exports, it might facilitate foreign bond
15TABLE 3
IsinesscycleIndicators for advanced countries
Net capital World price
outflow at level
Import Terms of 1929 prices (US export
GDP volume trade $million unit values)
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 355 100.0
1930 94.6 9)4.8 106.1 145 89.6
1931 89.3 89.5 111.8 —1 422 69.14
1932 83.0 76.5 113.7 —1 661 59.0
1933 814.0 78.14 1114.8 1 006 61.9
19314 89.2 79.6 111.1 —1 2514 72.14
1935 94.3 81.8 108.0 —406 714.6
1936 101.6 85.7 100.6 —176 76.1
1937 107.0 97.4 103.9 —1 677 80.6
1938 109.3 87.0 108.3 —1 413 714.6
1973 100.0 100.0 100.0 8 919 100.0
19714 100.4 101.1 88.4 7 020 127.6
1975 99.8 92.7 90.3 12 507 1142.6
1976 105.1 105.5 89.8 12 1416 1147.5
1977 109.1 109.5 88.7 13 1429 152.7
1978 113.5 115.4 91.1 17 2141 163.3
1979 117.3 124.0 87.3 16 265 185.9
1980 118.8 121.8 81.3 114215 211.0
1981 120.14 118.4 80.2 15 792 230.4
1982 119.9 117.6 81.9 124340 232.9
1983 122.8 122.0 83.14 11 702 236.5
Notes: GDP Import volumeandterms of trade are weighted averages for 16
countries.The capital flows are deflated by the US export unit
value index.The US export unit value in 1973 was 251 per cent
of its 1929 level.
Source:Maddison (1985, p.13).
16TABLE 14
Bisiness cycleIndicators for 11developlr€countries
Export Terms of Import Export Terms of Import
GDPvolumetrade volume GDPvolumetrade volume
Latin America Asia
1929 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
1930 96.1 81.2 81.5 77.4 101.1 91.3 90.4 89.5
1931 90.0 90.0 67.9 51.9 101.4 86.6 83.5 82.3
1932 86.7 73.0 71.4 39.5 103.8 77.7 84.2 78.5
1933 93.2 75.7 68.8 45.5 1014.5 80.0 82.1 71.2
1934 101.0 85.4 76.5 52.5 99.4 82.6 86.6 76.7
1935 106.3 91.9 75.2 56.4 104.2 821.7 92.3 82.6
1936 113.24 93.3 80.6 61.7 109.9 94.1 94.9 81.0
1937 120.8 101.8 89.1 76.8 110.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1938 121.4 (81.4) (84.9) (70.9)106.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1973 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1974 106.7 100.4 95.8 126.4 101.6 101.7 97.5 109.1
1975 109.7 100.1 88.5 119.5 110.0 107.8 91.9 110.9
1976 116.0 112.1 94.1 112.0 110.2 132.0 97.0 121.9
1977 122.3 123.2 914.7 110.9 119.3 142.9 102.0 132.9
1978 127.3 141.2 87.9 121.2 131.7 163.6 97.7 157.5
1979 136.1 152.6 87.5 141.8 136.8 171.8 9)4.5 165.3
1980 1)43.9 167.7 92.1 169.7 1)45.2 189.6 91.2 176.3
1981 143.9 190.3 85.6 175.1 153.0 209.6 86.4 183.0
1982 1)42.3 194.0 83.1 132.3 161.6 220.4 81.2 176.5
1983 139.3 214.7 80.2 103.7 174.1 245.7 75.9 193.3
Notes: The above indices are all weighted averages.Latin America
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colc!nbia, Cuba and Mexico.
Asia includes China, India, Indonesia, Korea and Taiwan.
Source:Maddison (1985, p.14).
17flotations. Nevertheless, policymakers themselves saw depreciation
as a threat to the national credit, albeit one less seriousthan
default.
The pre—sterling depreciations were a Latin American and
Antipodean phenomenon, starting with Uruguay in April 1929 and
followed in rapid succession by Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil,
Australia, New Zealand, Venezuela, Bolivia and Mexico. &ustralia's
experience is especially revealing, since both defaultand
devaluation were resisted so strongly.13 The Australian economy was
adversely affected by both declining wool and wheat pricesand
increasingly stringent London credit conditions. As early as the
first semester of 1929, the Commonwealth Bank had been alarmed by
the decline in its sterling balances and by its inability to float
new loans in London. But despite the rising opportunitycost of
debt service, little consideration was given to the option of
default, in the hope that faithful maintenance of service might
permit floating new loans in London. Instead, to curb importsthe
banks rationed foreign exchange and increased their rates against
sterling while attempting to stay within the gold points. These
expedients were viewed as temporary, and their reversal was
anticipated as soon as new loans could be floated. The authorities
obtained additional breathing space through the nassage of
legislation (patterned after the British qold Standard and Currency
and Bank Notes Acts of 1925 and 192S) which concentrated Australian
gold holdings in the authorities' hands. Citizens were required to
exchange gold for notes, and specie exports were discouraged by
specifying a minimum quantity of gold (400 ounces fine) which could
18be obtained on demand. Hence there was additional scope for
depreciation without destroying the gold standard facade.
To strengthen the trade balance and stave off depreciation,
Australia adopted no fewer than seven new tariff schedules between
April and December 1930. Exports were promoted by a "Grow More
Wheat Campaign" and by bounties or bonuses for wine—making and gold
mining. Ultimately, these efforts proved inadequate due to
deteriorating world market conditions and to resistance within
Labour circles to further deflationary policies. When in December
1930 a political impasse over the budget deficit threatened to
unleash a wave of capital flight, those in banking circles who
viewed devaluation as damaging to Australian credit acceded to the
others who insisted that devaluation would he acknowledged instead
as a beneficial step "towards recognition of the true state of
affairs".14 In January the currency was depreciated substantially,
at which point it held until sterling's devaluation the following
September. The authorities continued to hope that additional
borrowing on the London market might prove possible; hence little
serious consideration was given to the alternative of default
except by Labour heretics such as Jack Lang in New South Wales.
Debt Default
Even after suspending convertibility, many countries found it
difficult or impossible to maintain service on their external
debt.15 The debt crisis that followed can he characterized as
falling into three phases.16 The first, spanning calendar year
1931, is dominated by Latin American defaults. During the second,
from January 1932 through June 1933, default spread to Southern and
19Eastern Europe. The third, whose opening coincided with the
Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933, was dominated by
Germany's reduction of service on its foreign debt.
Macroeconomic events, rather than disturbances limited to
financial markets, played a leading role in the onset of the debt
crisis. The Great Depression affected the ability of governments to
generate both the tax revenues needed to service debt and the
foreign exchange required to transfer revenues abroad. Plummeting
economic activity and rising unemployment increased budgetary
expenditures at the same time revenues fell. The decline in export
values and volumes led to a rapid contraction of foreign exchange
earnings (see Table 4). In much the same manner that an isolated
bank failure can he infectious given depositors' incomplete
information about the solvency of other banks, defaults by a few
countries caused investors to revise their expectations for
continued debt service by others. International lending all but
evaporated following Bolivia's January 1931 default, and with the
collapse of lending, the incentive to keep debt service current was
further reduced.17
The Latin American defaults that dominated the first phase of
the crisis exhibited common features. Typically they resulted from
the interaction of declining primary—commodity prices with
government budget deficits (due both to expenditures on
nonproductive projects and to the macroeconomic slump).18 Debt
crisis and domestic political instability interacted in a vicious
circle: political instability hindered attempts to achieve fiscal
reform, while the crisis environment and the draconian policies
20adopted to redress the debt and budget problems threatened to
undermine the most stable of governments. Although Bolivia's
default was in large part a function of a 40 per cent fall in the
dollar price of tin, a long history of budgetary mismanagement
culminating in the government's overthrow also played a role, as the
Britishconsul had recognised fully three months before default:
"The unlimited depredations on the State coffers by the
late head of the country and his minions have left the
country bled white, and there are no resources left on
which to fall back. In fact there is every prospect that
Bolivia will be obliged to default on her obligations in
connection with foreign loans falling due in December."19
In Peru, as in Bolivia, the onset of the Depression exacerbated
political unrest which culminated in revolution. While Peru's new
government put a stop to what the British consul described as the
previous administration's "reckless scuandering" of funds, it was
still forced to halt debt service in March 1931 on the grounds that
the Treasury was bare of funds.20 Chile, which also experienced
revolution and suffered greatly from the decline in nitrate and
copper prices, defaulted four months later. Brazil, hit by a
disastrous fall in coffee prices and similarly undergoing
revolution, defaulted in October.
Default spread to Europe one year to the day after its
appearance in Latin America. Compared with the Latin American
republics, most Central and East European countries had suffered
less from the collapse of primary—commodity prices (due to greater
export diversification) and had pursued more austere budgetary
21policies. They were hesitant to interrupt service on the grounds
that much of their debt had been arranged under League of Nations
auspices. Nonetheless, Hungary's default in January 1932 was
followed in rapid succession by those of Greece, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia.
The final phase of the crisis was ushered in by Germany's
default. The German authorities had previously limited the
transfer of funds to extinguish maturing loans hut refrained from
interfering with interest transfers. As in Latin America, default
was associated with political upheaval. One of the first steps of
the National Socialist Party upon taking power in 1933 was to
convene a conference of bondholders' representatives with the
intention of rescheduling the debt. Arrangements were made to
transfer a share of accrued debt service into foreign currency, to
issue scrip in place of the rest, and to convert maturing coupons
into funding bonds. With few exceptions, the dollar obligations of
German states, municipalities and corporations were brought under
the control of the Reichsbank's Conversion Office.
Strikingly, debt default had limited repercussions in the
foreign exchange market. The currencies of most defaulting Latin
American countries had already depreciated, while the currencies of
the major European debtors were under exchange control. 1oreover,
in contrast to the 1980s, the deterioration of long—term foreign
assets posed no direct threat to the banking systems of the creditor
countries. Links from debt default to bank failures were broken
because foreign lending took place not through hank loans hut
through the issue of bonds, few of which were held by banks in the
22creditor countries. Banks might participate in the syndicate which
organized the loan and serve as purchasers of' last resort if the
market failed to take up the entire issue. But even in such
instances, banks could resell their share of the issue once bond—
market conditions improved.
Commercial banks also purchased foreign bonds as investments,
although information on the extent of this practice is sketchy and
incomplete. For the United States, the Comptroller of the Currency
provided only aggregated information on the foreign bond holdings
of National Banks. According to these data, foreign bonds accounted
for but a small share, on the order of 7.5 per cent, of the bond
holdings of National Banks, and bonds for less than a third of total
assets. The Comptroller provided no information which might he used
to estimate what share of these foreign bonds were subject to
default risk. But unlike the Comptroller, who listed foreign bonds
only as a group, the Vermont Bank Commissioner in 1930 reported the
book value of the individual foreign bonds held by each state—
chartered bank and trust company.21 Table 5 lists foreign
government bonds held by mutual savings banks, trust companies and
savings and loan associations in Vermont on 30 June 1930. Ex post,
and perhaps also ex ante given the relatively small discounts from
par, most of these bonds appear to have been subject to relatively
little default risk. Of the 58 banks under the commissioner's
supervision, one closed its doors in 1930, but due to a bad domestic
loan rather than foreign bonds, of which the bank in question in
fact held none. While foreign bonds accounted for a larger share of
the portfolios of the banks of certain other states, it is hard to
23TABLE 5
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Miscellaneous Canadian bondssee howforeign defaults alone could have posed a serious threat to
the US banking system. It is likely that the same conclusion
holds for the UK and other creditor countries.
A more serious threat was posed by the liquidation offoreign
bank deposits. The exception to the debtor—country rule ofgiving
priority to debt over convertibility concerned the treatment of
short—term credits. These credits typically originated in
connection with commercial transactions. As the Depression
deepened, not only did credits to finance international transactions
become redundant, but financial uncertainty induced foreigners to
convert them into domestic currency. Commercial banks in the
indebted regions consequently experienced sudden withdrawals of
foreign balances. Their governments responded with exchange control
and prohibitions on the repatriation of short—term capital. For
example, when in October 1931 Argentina experienced accelerating
depreciation, it imposed exchange control and froze short—term
liabilities, which were owed predominantly to British creditors.
After nineteen months an agreement was reached with Britain, under
the provisions of which a long—term loan was floated toprovide
funds to transfer the frozen accounts. What is noteworthy is that
Argentina, at the same time as it faithfully maintained service on
its long—term debt, did not hesitate to restrict foreignaccess to
short—term liabilities. The difference is attributable to the
higher costs of leaving short—term debt unfettered, given its
volatility in response to changes in anticipated returns, and the
greater benefits of leaving service on long—term debt uninterrupted
in the hope that additional long—term borrowing might againprove
25possible for the creditworthy.22
Short—term Credits, Bank Failures and Intervention
The preceding discussion has focused on links between
exchange—rate convertibility and debt. A noteworthy aspect of
Argentine experience is the absence of the next link in the chain,
from debt and exchange rates to bank failures. While, as noted
above, sovereign default was not a major source of instability of
creditor—country banking systems, the same was not always true of
debtor—country banks. Short—term debt was an important item on the
liability side of many debtor—country—bank balance sheets, even if,
due to theirgreater size, itrepresentedasmall item on the asset
side of creditor—country—bank balance sheets.
In particular, foreign attempts to repatriate short—term
credits in the summer of 1 931 posed maj or threats to the solvency
oftheAustrian and German banking systems. Serious difficulties
surfacedin Europe with the run on the Austrian Credit—Anstalt in
May 1931. The problems of the Credit—Anstalt, while largely of
domestic origin, were greatly complicated by its dependence on
foreign credits. Austria had been the second European state (after
Sweden) to stabilize its currency, and the early date of its
stabilization in conjunction with League of Nations sponsorship
promoted a sizeable inflow of foreign funds to the banking system.
The Credit—Anstalt had participated fully in the amalgamation
movement of the 1920s, absorbing the Eodenkreditanstalt and its
portfolio of dubious industrial loans, and in 1929, when the market
value of these loans declined precipitously, this amalgamation
returned to haunt it.23 Regulations forced the Credit—Anstalt to
26publish its 1930 balance sheet on 11 May 1931, revealing that it
had lost more than half its capital, the criterion according to
which it was officially declared insolvent. This announcement
provoked large—scale withdrawals by domestic and foreign
creditors.24 A $14 million credit obtainedthrough the Bank for
International Settlements was exhausted within five days, and a
subsequent loan from the Bank of England lasted little longer. The
government's next step was to freeze foreign balances, and on 16
June 1931 foreign creditors agreed to a two—year suspension of
transfers provided that the Austrian Government guaranteed the
debts. A second standstill between other Austrian banks and their
creditors followed. Although this freeze of foreign transfers did
not put a halt to domestic withdrawals, which continued through
1931, the Credit—Anstalt's doors remained open by virtue of large
rediscounts with the National Bank. This aspect of Austrian
experience suggests a lesson common to Europe and Latin America:
shocks with the potential to destabilize the banking system did not
lead to generalized collapse because central banks acted in lender—
of—last—resort capacity and simply did not permit this to occur.25
The Austrian run alerted creditors to the precarious position
of other countries dependent upon short—term credits from abroad,
notably Germany and the successor states of Eastern Europe. Table
6 indicates the extent of short—term foreign indebtedness of the
German banking system. Even had German banks not sharedmany of
the weaknesses of their Austrian counterparts, they would have
suffered withdrawals given depositors' incomplete information about
their position and the signal provided by the Credit—Anstalt
27TABLE 6
Short—tenn Indebtedness ofSeiectediropean Countries
(millions of US dollars)
Central Local Gross
Govern— autho—CentralOtherOther Foreign
Country Date ment rities bank banks debtors Total Debt
Austria IX 1932 114.1 0.3 19.11 155.7 583
Hungary XI 1931 142.8 21.8 25.3 106.7 1214.0 320.3 695*
Bulgaria XII 1931 14.2 3.14 1.1 10.3 23.11 112.11 n.a.
Poland XII 1931 0.11 27.9 33.11 1130
Rcxnania 1932 13.5 23.7 141.9 79.1 965
Dennark XII 1932 36.2 61.2 361
Finland XII 1932 7.5 1.11 14.7 211.11 17.5 55.5 296
Noriay I1933 19.7 106.9 128.8 373
Germany IX 1932 1118.0 193.6 918.14963.32,223.3 14670
Note: Asterisk denotes 1930 value; n.a. denotes not available. Gross
foreign indebtedness for Poland includes direct foreign investnent.
Sources: League of Nations (1933, 1937, 1938) and Royal Institute (1937).
28crisis.26 The Darmstadter Bank, which failed on 13 July 1931, had
invested heavily in textiles in general and in the bankrupt
Nordwolle firm in particular, as well as in the nearly insolvent
municipalities of the Rhine—Ruhr region. Foreign deposits figured
prominently on the liability side of its balance sheet. Between
mid—1930 and July 1931, German statistics show withdrawals of 2.5 to
3 RM billion in short—term foreign credits, or roughly half of the
gross short—term liabilities of the 28 most important German banks.
In the six weeks ending 13 July 1931, the Darmstadter lost 30 per
cent of its deposits, culm.nating in a run that forced the closure
of all German financial institutions. As the price of state
support, the Reich fused the Darmstadter with another bank and
replaced its board of directors. To prevent capital flight, the
Reichsbank was given a monopoly of transactions in foreign exchange.
Under the provisions of an agreement coming into force in September,
transfers of short—term debt were suspended for six months and then
for a year starting February 1932. Nonperforming assets were
written down and new capital was secured with the aid of the
Treasury and, indirectly, the Reichsbank.
Next to Austria and Germany, Hungary was most seriously
affected by the liquidation of short—term credits. In the Hungarian
case, first the Credit—Anstalt disclosures led to a withdrawal of
foreign credits, and then the German banking crisis precipitated a
domestic run. The government declared a three—day bank holiday,
limited withdrawals and instituted exchange control. Together with
heavy rediscounts by the Central Bank, these measures prevented
widespread failures. The experience of Romania, the next largest
29short—term external debtor, differed in that official exchange
controiwas only introduced inMay 1932, and initsabsence
rediscounts with the National Bank were provided even more
liberally.
The role of the lender of last resort in containing bank
failures is evident in Latin America as well.As noted above,
Argentina escaped bank failures because of the substantial
rediscount and other credits extended to commercial banks by the
Banco de la Nacion: rediscounts rose from80million pesos at the
end of 1928 to 160 million pesos in April 1931 ,whileadvances to
banks against government bills rose from 190 to 250 million pesos.
Where rediscounts were less liberally provided, instability was
greater: in Peru, for example, the Banco del Peru y Londres
suspended payments in October 1930, occasioning a banking
moratorium lasting through the end of the year. The authorities
responded by encouraging amalgamations and, after 1931, by
increas ing rediscounts.
The United Kingdom and the United States are the two prominent
exceptions to this pattern, the UK because the banking system was
not threatened, the US because of the extent to which it was.
The relationship between the prices of industrial and bank stocks
shown in Table 7 can be taken to indicate the condition of national
banking systems relative to the condition of national economies.
The table confirms that the British banking system weathered the
crisis exceptionally well while the American banking system
suffered profoundly.
30TABLE 7
Indicesof Prices of rik Shares and
Industrial Shares, 1930—1933
(1929=100)
VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII
193019301931 19311932 193219331933
Belgium Banks 66 55 147 36 30 35 35 35
Industrial 72 55 52 35 29 36 35 29
Canada Banks 85 80 72 69 145 50 54 47
Industrial 62 45 314 28 18 22 39 110
Derinark Banks 93 96 92 75 70 78 91 101
Industrial 92 90 88 81 71 7)4 85 90
France Banks 89 76 73 146 147 5)4 52 50
Industrial 85 66 62 11 144 147 48 143
Germany Banks 88 714 66 n.a.'35 35 37
Industrial 86 62 53n.a)36 147 56 52
Netherlands Banks 9)4 83 82 56 147 57 66 58
Industrial 73 51 143 30 21 30 33 32
U.K.2 Banks3 92 97 89 68 82 96 96 101
Industrial 75 64 56 49 145 57 63 70
U.S.A. Banks14 67 143 38 21 114 23 21 15
Industrial 77 55 147 29 18 24 142 143
Sweden Banks 1014 101 93 70 50 53 53 58
Industrial 90 80 73 148 31 35 39 39
Switzerland Banks 98 96 97 61 149 61 60 60
Industrial 89 75 77 50 145 514 68 66
Notes: 1.No quotation.
2.31.XII.1928 =100.
3.Banks and discount companies.
14.NewYork bank shares.
Source:League of Nations (1934).
31In the British case, external credits again play a role, but in
a rather different fashion.27 The extent of Britain's short—term
liabilities, while known to experts, was heralded by the publication
of the Macmillan Committee Report in the summer of 1931. Combined
with uncertainty about the defensibility of the sterling parity due
to a budgetary impasse and British creditors' inability to withdraw
funds from Austria and Germany, it led to a run on the pound which
forced Britain from the gold standard in September. But since the
discount market and the Government, not only the banks, relied on
foreign funds, and since the run took the form mainly of sales of
foreign—owned Treasury bills and withdrawals of credits previously
granted to the discount market, it posed little threat to the
banking system. In the three months ending September 1931, total
deposits of the ten London clearing banks fell by £70 million, not
an insignificant amount but small in comparison with experiences on
the Continent.
Even in the United States, where agricultural foreclosure and
industrial insolvency are typically emphasized as explanations for
bank failure, foreign credits played a role. Signs of widespread
financial distress surfaced in June 1931, when foreigners reduced
their holdings of dollar acceptances and transferred their deposits
from commercial to reserve banks. With Britain's abandonment of
the gold standard these movements accelerated. In part these
withdrawals of foreign deposits reflected the imposition of
exchange control abroad, which rendered the United States one of
the few remaining sources of liquidity for foreigners scrambling
for funds.
32Foreign withdrawals were particularly damaging to the
banking system because they reinforced domestic sources of
weakness. In the course of the 1920s, US commercial banks had
greatly augmented the security and real estate components of their
portfolios.28 Collapse of the security and mortgage markets
therefore rendered their asset position especially vulnerable.
Real estate loans, which tended to be geographically undiversified
due to restrictions on branch banking, increased the vulnerability
of thousands of small unit banks to sector—specific shocks. Their
desperate attempts to restore liquidity induced them to call in
open—market loans and sell securities. Similar responses occurred
in other countries although, as Table S makes clear, the liquidity
position of US banks had eroded particularly dramatically over
preceding years.29 In response, US banks restricted loans,
giving rise to widespread complaints among manufacturing firms
about a shortage of credit. The scramble for liquidity reinforced
the collapse of the bond market. The prices of domestic bonds fell
so dramatically that by June 1932, when the rate on 3—month
acceptances had fallen below one per cent, domestic industrial
bonds were quoted on an 1 1 per cent yield basis and second grade
rails yielded 19 per cent. While some component of these yields
indicates the magnitude of the risk premium, their high level may
also reflect distress sales and therefore the generalized effects of
the financial crisis, which severely disrupted the domestic bond
market's ability efficiently to allocate funds among competing uses
in much the same manner that the collapse of the market in foreign




1929 1930 1931 1932
France 7.14 9.7 13.9 33.6
Switzerland n.a. n.a. 11.3 22.9
United Kirigdan 11.3 11.5 11.7 11.5
United States 7.3 7.11 7.6 8.2
Italy 6.9 6.6 6.2 5.9
Gennariy 3.1 2.7 3.6 3.24
Poland 8.5 8.8 10.7 9.0
Sweden 2.1 2.3 2.1 3.8
Czechoslovakia 6.7 7.3 7.2 7.24
South Africa 10.3 10.0 9.1 10.1
Argentina 17.9 1)4.2 13.4 17.5
Australia 15.6 13.24 19.2 17.8
Canada 13.3 12.1 10.9 12.2
Chile 14.24 12.6 9.5 26.14
Japan 9.1 9.0 10.1 9.8
New Zealand 12.3 13.0 13.7 11.5
Note: n.a. signifies not available.
Source:League of Nations (1933).
3LfAlthough the literature on the American Depression emphasizes
the two waves of bank failures in the late autumn of 1 930 and early
spring of 1933, in fact failures continued throughout. In October
1931, for example, 522 banks with deposits amounting to $470 million
were forced to suspend payments, and in the 12 months ending in June
1932, 2429 US banks failed. Again, the pattern of failure mirrors
the actions of the authorities. In the spring of 1932 the incidence
of bank failures declined as the Federal Reserve expanded credit
through rediscounts and open market operations, but this
expansionary initiative was reversed soon thereafter, permitting a
resurgence of commercial bank insolvencies.31
The US case provides a graphic illustration of linkages running
from bank failures to other markets and to the macroeconomy.
Although it is still disputed whether monetary stringency, much of
which resulted from bank failures, was a factor in the onset of the
Great Depression, it is widely agreed that these monetary factors
were central to its singular depth and long duration. The inability
of the Federal Reserve to prevent widespread bank failures, along
with its inability to interrupt the linkages running back from bank
failures to financial markets and to the macroeconomy, is a central
explanation for the severity of the crisis in the United States.
Thus, one reason for the exceptional depth of the Great Depression
in the US was that policy was used less effectively than in other
countries to prevent the transformation of financial market
disturbances into a generalized financial crisis.
35II. Fifty Years Later
A. The Periods Compared
A summary of the apparent similarities and differences
between our two periods will be useful background for our
analysis. In the 1930s as in the 1980s, illiquidity was not
confined to any one country or region. In neither instance can
the problems of debtor countries be attributed exclusively to
domestic causes —externalshocks from the world economy were
transmitted through sharp rises in real interest rates and falls
in commodity prices and the economic activity of industrial
countries. The burden of reparations inhibited expansion just as
the burden of debt service does in many countries today (McNeil,
1986).
There can be no exact dating of recent troubles in
international financial markets, nor a fortiori a precise
correspondence between 1929 and 1979. Nevertheless, to take 1979
as the beginning of the contemporary period of interest is not
merely a convenient metaphor. Admittedly, one cannot identify at
that point a classical panic, preceded by "mania", then "distress",
and followed by sharp, generalized price falls (Kindleberger, 1978).
But conditions in the world economy and financial system clearly did
deteriorate from the second oil shock to the Mexican collapse of
August 1982, which marks the onset of the "debt crisis" in popular
consciousness.
Any simple analogy with 1932, however, would be equally
inappropriate. For just as the contemporary debt crisis began the
36American economy entered a period of strong expansion which
compensated, until recently, for the drag on world economic activity
caused by the overhang of LDC debt and restrictive macroeconomic
adjustment policies adopted to deal with it.
We have seen many debt reschedulings hut not widespread,
extended interruptions of service and amortization on the scale of
the 1930s; even the deterioration of relations between Peru and the
IMP in August 1986 is not strictly comparable to the defaults which
began in January 1931. There have been wide swings in nominal and
real exchange rates but no significant currency collapses, nor any
resort to inconvertibility or new exchange controls to protect any
major currency. Real interest rates rose to historically
exceptional heights, hut there was no worldwide dramatic fall of
investment. Large government budget deficits in industrialized
countries have in most cases (with a major exception!) been brought
under control, with many crisis budgets but no collapse of
government finances. There have been Jarge trade imbalances and
repeated threats of a plunge into overt protectionism, but in
practice we have seen only the gradual accretion of non—tariff
barriers to trade. Failures of individual financial institutions
have been isolated, without generalized runs or significant
contractions in the credit base. One authority judges that the
crisis was worst in 1982—84 and is now over (Kindleberger, 1986).
We are less sanguine, and we stress in particular the need
for continued and improved international policy coordination in
providing the regulatory and macroeconomic environments necessary to
prevent financial crisis. But despite greater interdependence in
37the world economy —andpartly in response to it —institutional
change and economic policies have tended to break, block or
attenuate the linkages of our Figure 1.A further difference from
the 1930s is more difficult to analyze: the growing assertiveness
of the United States and the political consensus among the major
industrialized countries in dealing with international debt problems
(Diaz—Alejandro, 1984; Portes, 1986). It has been more difficult
for any single debtor country, particularly in Latin America, to
break ranks, and the cohesion of the creditors' cartel contrasts
sharply with feeble efforts at coordination among debtors.
As noted, in both the 1930s and 1980s, the preceding decade had
been marked by major changes in the structure and management of the
international political economy. Before World War I, the United
Kingdom played the pivotal role in the world economy, using its
investment income to run a trade deficit that allowed other
countries to pursue export—led growth. When World War I and its
aftermath cut that income, the United States assumed the financial
role of the world's leading creditor without taking on the
corresponding responsibility of running an import surplus with open
markets, thus leaving a structural weakness in the system. Now the
transition from the United States to Japan as dominant lender is
similarly occurring without a shift by Japan into import surplus
(though in this case, with little immediate weakening of American
political dominance).
Yet differences between the periods preclude simple
generalizations. In the 1970s, the banks did not act merely as
intermediaries in placing LDC bond issues among many dispersed
38bondholders, but rather took on very large direct exposure, with
corresponding risk to themselves and the financial system.32
Although there was significant cross—border lending among banks in
the earlier period, the density of international interbank
relationships now is incomparably greater. For both reasons,
creditors have been much better organized in the 1980s than in the
1930s, a change that has favored rescheduling rather than default.33
But banks appear to have paid no more attention to sovereign risk
in the lending of the 1970s than in that of the 1920s. And they
lent at considerably shorter maturities than those of the 1920s bond
issues.
An institutional difference of considerable practical
importance is the International Ivlonetary Fund. To some extent, the
IMP acts as international lender of last resort, while also serving
the capital market in a signalling capacity, providing information
on domestic adjustment programs and helping to differentiate among
borrowers. There are also stronger domestic lenders of last resort
(new, in some countries), with more extensive supervisory and regu-
latory roles now than fifty years ago despite recent moves towards
deregulation; and there is deposit insurance in many countries. The
macroeconomic background differs as well, with much greater
experience of stabilization policies, a system of floating exchange
rates in existence for over a decade, and extended international
discussion of domestic macroeconomic policies in economic summits,
the OECD and the EEC. Finally, there is greater political stability
in relations among the industrialized creditor countries, and
perhaps greater internal political stability in the LDC debtors.
39B. The Environment
Our description of the international financial environment
begins with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods payments settlement
and exchange rate systems in the early 1970s. A detailed history is
not needed here. But the major events have brought deep structural
change closely analogous to that of the 1920s, in the exchange rate
system, in international lending, and in financial institutions.
The changes in the exchange rate system during 1971—73, while
in the opposite direction to those of the mid—1920s, were equally
profound and far—reaching.34 Official convertibility of dollars
into gold was abandoned in August 1971, and the adjustable—peg
exchange—rate mechanism gave way to unrestricted floating in March
1973. The "reform" negotiations of the C20 and its successors could
not reconstruct or replace the constraints which Bretton Woods had
imposed on the autonomy of national monetary authorities. The new
freedoms and powers were de jure rather than de facto, however, as
policy—makers, academic analysts and the markets soon discovered.
The same capital mobility which made the old exchange rate system
untenable also made true autonomy infeasible.
Among the many complementary explanations for the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, we stress capital mobility
as fundamental. So did the architects of the system and their
predecessors. Nurkse (1944) identified "disequilibrating" capital
flows as a major cause of the disturbances of the interwar period.
Keynes insisted that controls over capital movements be an essential
component of the postwar monetary order, and the Bretton Woods
Agreement made no provision for convertibility for capital account
0transactions. But the progressive relaxation of exchange controls
and convertibility restrictions starting in the early 1950s did
extend to capital flows. Their volume and speed grew dramatically
as a function of technological innovation and profit opportunities.
Since the authorities were unwilling to make the Bretton Woods
exchange rate system their sole policy target, official
convertibility and the adjustable peg could not withstand the
pressures arising from the growing sophistication, scope and
integration of international capital markets. This process has of
course continued, and we return to it below.
Currency convertibility and the international institutions
established at Eretton Woods survive. Moreover, the political
relationship between France and Germany in the context of the
European Community gave rise in 1979 to the European Monetary
System, with its exchange rate mechanism providing a "zone of
[relative] monetary stability" among most of the EC currencies.35
Even outside the exchange—market intervention in the EMS, the major
currencies have not floated freely since 1973. Exchange rates have
been regarded as important indicators or even targets for monetary
policy, leading to intervention, whether unsterilized or
sterilized.36 This raises the ciuestion whether, by the end of the
1970s, the resulting exchange rate system was well—suited to absorb
major macroeconomic and financial shocks, or whether the system
propagated or even magnified such disorders, which might then be
transmitted to capital markets and the financial system (linkages
III and V in Figure 1).
The explosive growth of international lending in the 1970s is
L+1also familiar to contemporary observers.37 Analysts still differ,
however, in the importance they assign to supply and demand factors
affecting international lending during the period. Econometric
explanations of its volume and price perform no better than
econometric models of exchange rate behaviour. It is clear that the
1970s saw a striking, unexpected growth of liability financing of
balance—of—payments deficits under little apparent constraint for
most countries; and that aggregate liquidity in the world economy
was correspondingly demand—determined.
The process of institutional change in the banking system
during the 1970s was also driven by the powerful forces of
internationalization and the technological change which stimulated
and facilitated it. The pace of internationalization may have
slowed somewhat in the past five years.38 This has not eased
the regulatory authorities' task in keeping abreast of these
changes. The problems of the banking system in 1974—75, from
spectacular bank failures like Franklin National and Herstatt to
many lesser difficulties, weresurmounted.39 But the Basle
concordat of 1975 was just the beginning ofamuch more active,
continuous process of consultation among central banks, in good part
through the continuing work of the Cooke Committee. This
internationalized prudential supervision also forms an important
partof the environment in which the events of the past several
years have transpired.
1+2C. Disturbances and their Management
The two major sources of recent instability are those of fifty
years earlier: disturbances in the foreign exchange market and
sovereign debt.
Major exchange rate swings and misalignments, as well as sharp
deterioration in the debt—servicing capacity of individual
countries, have undoubtedly threatened domestic financial
institutions and the international financial system. There have
been isolated, individual cases of bank failures, some quite
spectacular, at least judging by the reaction of the media. Banco
Ambrosiano, Johnson Matthey and Continental Illinois offered high—
grade material to all from sensational journalists to sober
academics. The scandals and political fallout were greater in Rome
and London than in Chicago, but financially the most serious was
Continental Illinois, then the 20th largest U.S. bank and a major
participant in the international interbank market. Despite a
classic run by foreign holders of its CDs, the bank was saved by the
regulators (without bailing out its officers and shareholders), and
there were no spread effects nor generalized financial crisis
resembling the 1930s.
Stresses in foreign exchange markets, international lending and
the banking system are striking, and they suggest analogies with the
interwar period. These comparisons help to explain why there has so
far been no collapse like that of the 1930s and shed light on the
continuing vulnerability of the financial system. We shall
therefore turn to data on the size of imbalances and shocks, on the
capacity of the exchange—rate system to cope with misalignments and
3volatility, and on how the debt crisis has been managed. We then
consider the linkages represented in Figure 1 and the roles of
policy and institutional change in attenuating them.
Exchange Rates
The exchange rate system operating since 1973 has survived both
unexpectedly high volatility and substantial misalignments without
exchange—market collapse or any overall drift towards controls.4°
Central bank intervention has doubtless helped; few would argue that
it has been destabilizing, though many would judge its influence to
be marginal. It has certainly not eliminated short—run volatility.
Nor has market learning reduced volatility as the floating—rate
period has gone on. Even the EMS has had only limited effects:
among the major EMS currencies, only the Deutschmark and lira
experienced clear declines in overall volatility (with respect to
all currencies) from 1978 to 1984.41 On most assessments, however,
the EMS has succeeded in reducing volatility among the currencies
participating in its exchange—rate mechanism, as one would expect.42
Yet more than a decade of learning among market participants
and the authorities has apparently not delivered the supposedly
stabilizing effects of speculative activity. The EMS may be
interpreted as one response to this disappointment, while the
rapidly developing forward and futures markets now provide ample
opportunities to protect against exchange—rate instability. Recent
evidence suggests, however, that these opportunities are not used
fully to insulate trade, and that exchange—rate volatility does in
fact have empirically significant effects on the volume of
LfLfinternational trade.43 And the new markets and instruments can be
used not only to hedge but also togamble. We must therefore regard
short—run volatility still as evidence of instability which might
itself spread through the financial and real economies.
Even more dangerous, however, are the large exchange—rate
swings and misalignments of long duration which have characterized
the period since 1973. Williamson (1985, p. 17) cites maximum
swings in real effective exchange rates during 1973—82 of 22 per
cent for the Deutschmark, 19 per cent for the French franc, 32 per
cent for the U.S. dollar, 35 per cent for the yen, and 60 per cent
for the pound. His graph (reproduced as our Figure 2) is striking
testimony to the magnitude of these gyrations and their extended
duration. His calculations of misalignments give one measure,
admittedly controversial, of the exchange—rate imbalances creating
strains on other elements of the financial system. Table 9 gives
these estimates of divergencies from "fundamental equilibrium
exchange rates" in 1984 Q4.One need not fully accept the
methodology or conclusions to judge that the misalignments are
likely to have been two to three times the magnitude of those
estimated by Keynes for the 1920s.
Even in the absence of' an agreed model of exchange—rate
determination, there is consensus that changes in such fundamentals
as the current account and purchasing power parities (or even "safe
haven" effects) cannot fully explain these shifts. Nor are they
solely due to inappropriate monetary policies and exchange—rate
targets (as the pegs of the 1920s represent). An unbalanced mix of


































































































































































































































































































































US dollar 137 n.a. n.a.
Japanese yen 89 Y 198 21
Deutschiark 87 DM 2.O 50
French franc 92 FF 6.51 I4LL
Pound sterling 107 $ 1.52 25
n.a.: Not applicable.
Source:Williamson (1985, p.79).
L7major industrial countries is a more comprehensive explanation,
especially insofar as it underlies the wide swings in nominal and
real interest rates and international interest rate differentials.
Yet it is increasingly agreed that speculative "bubbles", with or
without rational expectations, also played a role in accentuating
recent exchange—rate swings.44 If so, then exchange rates are still
highly uncertain for participants in trade and financial markets,
however much they hedge.
This longer—run uncertainty may reduce trade volumes just as
volatility appears to do, and direct investment may suffer as well.
Large and sustained misalignments impede trade by encouraging
protectionist policy responses. Since debt servicing capacity
derives from trade flows, there is an indirect link from the
exchange—market disturbances of the past decade to debt defaults
(linkage III in Figure 1). Yet this differs from the link we
identified for the earlier period, in which convertibility crises
and the threat of exchange control induced withdrawals of short—term
funds, which in turn could provoke default. Nor do exchange—rate
misalignments appear to have threatened the banking systems in
either creditor or debtor countries (linkage v).But exchange—rate
uncertainty and volatility may have increased the importance of this
link by offering banks new opportunities for speculation. Some have
participated aggressively in these markets (often seeking to build
up earnings depleted by bad loans), and some of these have not
succeeded (Franklin National and Rerstatt were early victims).
A more important example of linkage III can be found in the LDC
debtor countries themselves. In several cases, exchange—rate
8overvaluation has led to massive capital flight bydomestic
residents, seriously exacerbating debt—servicing difficulties.45
Insofar as overvaluation is a direct result of government policy,
exchange—market intervention rather than post—1973 exchange—rate
flexibility is the cause of the problem.
On balance, we are inclined to accept the judgment of Cooper
(1983) that flexible exchange rates have served more as a shock
absorber than as a source of destabilizing influences in the
financial system or as a link in their transmission. The
rnisalignments which this flexibility has permitted, by removing a
constraint on monetary and fiscal policies, have not themselves
provoked financial crisis or exacerbated financial instability,
whatever their negative effects on trade and investment. Indeed, it
is the process of correcting the misalignments without the
appropriate coordination of macro policy mixes which might be highly
d e st ab i 1 i z i n g.46
Debt
As in the 1920s, the growth and export performance of major
borrowing countries in the latter half of the 1970s gave some cause
for optimism regarding the recycling process and the prospects for
debt service.47 Table 10 gives data comparable with Table 2 for the
earlier period. In both cases, however, the assumption that
expansion would continue without major shocks proved to be false.
Theproblems which ensued were indeed similar. The major
external shocks which hit the debtor countries were global, not
country—specific. The second oil shock, the OECD recession and the
industrializedcountries' restrictive monetary policies created
L9TABLE 10
AnnualGrth Rates of RealGDPandExports, 1975—79
Expor'ts
















() more than 50% increase in 1979 over previous year.
Source: International Financial Statistics 1983 Yearbook.
50serious fiscal problems in the debtor countries (aggravated by
domestic mismanagement) and cut the prices and volumes of commodity
exports. Nominal interest rates finally rose to meet and exceed
inflation, bringing a sharp switch from negative to positive real
rates. Higher nominal rates also reduced debtor liQuidity by
shifting the burden of debt repayment towards the present (the tilt
effect). Then as inflation subsided, nominal interest rates fell
less quickly, and real rates rose further (see Figure 3).
Voluntary lending to LDCs by the commercial banks evaporated
after the Mexican crisis of August 1982; the Polish debacle of early
1981 had already hit lending to Eastern Europe and put Hungary and
Roniania in deep trouble.48 A wave of debt reschedulings followed:
there were a total of 36 "multilateral debt renegotiations't in 1975—
81 covering $19.6 billion of debt; then 10 in 1982 ($2.4 billion),
32 in 1983 alone ($51.7 billion), with some slackening in 1984, but
a record number of 41 reschedulings signed in 1985 dealing with
$92.8 billion of debt.49 Lenders reacted to new information about
global economic conditions and individual debtors with a
generalized, discrete change of regime in credit markets. Rather
than a continuous tightening of terms and constraints for borrowers,
this was a shift to credit rationing.
This change of credit—market regime was a response to
macroeconomic shocks exogenous to the credit markets whose effects
conveyed new information to lenders.5° Imperfect information about
one or at most a few borrowers was generalized to others, and
lenders' overall perceptions changed. The "disaster myopia"


















































































































































































































































































































 such information; and when the disaster scenario suddenly took on a
non—negligible subjective probability, lenders whose sole protection
was to try to maintain short loan maturities could react only by
pulling out of the market wherever possible.
The magnitude of the shocks which so dramatically affected
lenders' behaviour can be seen in Tables 11—13 and Figures 3 and 4.
The rise of 20 percentage points in real interest rates on floating—
rate debt from 1980 to 1981 is extraordinary. The fall in real
commodity price (excluding oil) of 26 per cent from 1980 Qi to 1983
Qi is of a similar magnitude to fifty years previously. Although
the terms of trade of non—oil LDCs (NLDCs) had peaked in 1977 Qi,
the decline of 18 per cent from 1979 Qi to 1983 Qi was still
substantial. The total effect in terms of real income is shown in
Table 13; for the non—oil debtors (excluding Argentina), there were
losses in G-DP from three to six per cent. As a real income loss,
this might be tolerable; as a required increase in transfer abroad,
it was indeed onerous.51
Consequences for the debt burden are shown in Tables 14 and 15.
Beginning in 1980, total indebtedness rose rapidly for the NLDCs,
and by 1982 their debt—export ratios far exceeded the levels
recorded in Table 2 for 1929 (which refer, however, only to central
government debt, whereas the recent data cover all foreign
liabilities). Most may still have been "solvent" on a suitable
long—run calculation,52 but with uncertain expectations, the
distinction between insolvency and illiquidity for a sovereign
debtor is both theoretically imprecise and politically untenable.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Real Percitage Interest 1te on U)C
Float1r—Rate Debt
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983





1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 19814 1985
Coffee (N.Y.) 112.5100.0 76.8 83.14 814.9 93.7 88.6
Copper (London) 90.3100.0 79.8 67.8 72.9 63.0 614.9
Petroleum
(Venezuela) 60.8100.0116.1116.1101.6 97.9 97.9
Rubber
(Singapore) 88.6100.0 78.8 60.2 714.767.2 53.3
Sugar (EEC
Import price) 87.14100.0 83.7 82.0 79.5 72.6 72.14
Tin (London) 92.1100.0 814.576.5 77.14 72.9 68.7
Quarter II
Source:International Financial Statistics 1985 Yearbook.
56TABLE 13
External Shock, 1979—83
Real Income Sum ofRealInterest
Percentage Change Effect as Rate and Terms of
in Terms of Trade Percentage Trade Effects on
from 1975—78 of GDP GDP (Percentage)
Argentina 3 0.2 1.6
Brazil —29 —2.3 —5.0
Chile —27 —11.9 —6.2
Mexico 26 1.8 1.2
Peru —22 —3.7
Venezuela 614 15.9 16.2
Colombia —18 —2.0 —2.8
Indonesia 36 6.1 6.2
Korea —3 —0.9 —3.8
Malaysia 1l 11.9 11.8
Thailand 14 —2.9 —3.3
Philippines —16 —3.2 —3.9
Source:Sachs (1985, pp.527—8).
57TABLE 114
GrossExternal Liabilities and Short—Tern Canponent
(billionUS dollars, end—year)
1978 1980 1981 1982 1983
Argentina Total 13.3 27.3 33.7 43.6 146.0
S 3.24 10.5 11.0 16.5 9.14
Brazil Total 53.14 70.0 79.9 91.0 95.5
S 7.1 13.5 15.3 17.24 124.2
Mexico Total 35.7 57.1 77.9 85.8 93.7
S 24.9 16.2 25.0 26.1 10.1
Peru Total 9.7 10.0 10.3 12.2 12.24
S 2.1 2.5 3.1 1.24
Venezuela Total 16.8 29.6 31.9 31.8 32.2
S 8.0 15.5 17.0 114.7 114.5
Nigeria Total 5.5 9.0 11.9 114.2 19.7
SlI 14.24 14.3 6.7
Korea Total 17.3 29.3 324.2 38.3 240.11
5 14.5 10.1 11.6 13.6 12.1
Indonesia Total 18.0 29.9 22.7 26.5 30.2
S 1.8 2.8 3.3 4.8 4.6
Philippines Total 10.8 17.24 20.8 224.2 23.9
S 3.9 7.6 9.14 11.3 9.24
Yugoslavia Total 12.5 18.5 20.7 20.0 20.3
S 1.2 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.9
Note: Short—term liabilities S are those of original maturity
lessthan one year.
Source:World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1985—86 edition.
58TABLE 15
Ratio of GrossExternalLiabilities to Exports of Goods arKi Services
(percentage)
1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 19814
Argentina 169 2144 285 14149 1471 1464
Brazil 369 301 296 388 392 3145
Mexico 313 232 256 310 327 301
Peru I401 206 2143 292 323 331
Venezuela 1514 133 130 158 186 182
Nigeria 145 33 61 110 179 160
Korea 101 130 125 135 133 128
Indonesia 159 914 91 125 151 1147
Philippines 220 214 2142 302 294 304
Yugoslavia 1147 1314 131 131 1514 1144
Source:World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1985—86.
59TABLE 16
ExposureofUS Banks to U)C Debtors
Percentageof Capital Billion $US
June1982 March 1986 March 1986
9 Money AllUS 9 Money AllUS
Center Banks Banks CenterBanks Banks AllUS banks
Mexico 50 38 38 22 24.2
Brazil 31 37 22 23.7
Korea 19 14 11 9 9.14
Venezuela 26 16 16 9 9.7
Argentina 21 13 14 8 8.5
Chile 12 9 9 6 6.3
Philippines 111 8 8 5 5.0
Colombia 8 5 2 2.3
Non—OPECLDCs227 154 1141 88 96.4
OPEC 35 60 33 18 19.4
Note:Banks' capital defined as equity, subordinated debt and loan—loss reserves.
"All US Banks" are those completing Country Exposure Report. Their total
capital base rose from $66.2 bn. in June 1982 to $109.7 bn. in March 1986.
Source: Fedeml Reserve Board.
60TABLE 17
ExposureofUS andUK banks In Mexico, Brazil,
Argentinaarxl VenezuelaasPercentage ofCapital
End1982 End19814
Bankof America 128 122
Chase Manhattan 139 1142
Manufacturers Hanover 234 173
Chenical 155 1314
Bankers Trust 131 1114
First Chicago 123 103
Citicorp n.a. 1140




Sources: Clime (1983, p.314) for 1982 and Lever—Hubne (1985)
for 19814.
61TABLE 18
BankShare Pr1ce/arn1rs 1t1o as PercitageofOverall










1986 (Jan-July) 56.8 146.1
At 15 Augusteachyear except 1986.
Source:Financial Times, Datastream.
6funds in 1982—3 evident in Table 14; together with capital flight,
they significantly increased the disaster probability. That
reaction could have activated linkages I, V and VI which proved so
devastating in the 1930s. The "debt strategy" was designed entirely
to contain it.
The dangers are evident from the data on bank exposure in
Tables 16 and 17 and on bank share prices in Table 18.The TJS banks
did not begin to recover from the 1982 plunge in their relative
price/earnings ratios until 1986, partly because of their subsequent
problems with energy and real estate loans. The UK banks have fared
somewhat better but show no sign of regaining the standing they
enjoyed in the 1970s.
Many useful case studies treat the impact of the debt crisis
on individual countries and regions and their responses.53
Nevertheless, we require much more empirical evidence on the role of
information about debt—servicing difficulties and their causes. How
do the markets perceive such information, process it, and then react
to individual borrowers and classes of borrowers? For example, we
have two contradictory assessments of market evaluations of Mexican
securities in the period leading up to August 1982, one finding a
continuous deterioration from the previous winter, the other
observing a discontinuous plunge shortly before the crisis became
manifest.54 How the market performs before a crisis is important in
assessing whether shifting more sovereign debt into the market
through securitization is likely to make the system more or less
stable.
The response of policy—makers to the debt crisis assumed that
63it was essentially and almost everywhere a problem of liquidity
rather than solvency, ignoring questions about the legitimacy of
that distinction. This approach may have been adequate in the short
run, when the key toavoidingfinancial crisis was maintaining
confidence. On plausible assumptions about growth, interest rates,
adjustment policies, industrial—country macro policies, and the
provision of bridging loans, projections showed substantial
improvement in the debt indicators during 1984—86 and a progressive
dissipation of the crisis thereafter.55
The ITS government's optimism did not last; hence the Baker
Plan in autumn 1985. For the objective of avoiding a financial
crisis, however, the strategy has been almost completely successful
so far in keeping both creditors and debtors on board. Neither the
reasons nor the prospects for continued success are entirely
obvious. There exist clear, level—headed, well—informed evaluations
of the costs and benefits of default to debtors which imply that
there are cases in which the benefits exceed the costs.56 As long
as rescheduling continues to eschew debt relief, this will remain
the case; yet historical comparisons suggest the likelihood of some
element of write—off, some ultimate sharing of the burden between
creditors and debtor.57 The question is whether there are
circumstances in which debt relief or write—offs are possible without
financial crisis.
The answer requires a judgment of the overall health of the
international banking system and a scenario for how the authorities
would react. Recently the banks have been building up their capital
base while writing off some sovereign debt (see Table 16). There
614remain problems on the asset side. Keeping maturities short has
little systemic advantage, since that just increases the
competition, when trouble threatens, to exit first and leave the
problem to other banks. It can he argued that some of the banks'
off—balance—sheet activities that have grown so fast recently are
relatively risky. On the other hand, securitization on the
liability side of banks' balance sheets reduces their dependence on
the highly volatile international interbank market.
Linkages
The discussion of recent disturbances and their management now
permits a comparison between the two periods of the operation of the
linkages we have stressed.
(I) Whereas the events threatening debt default endangered the
banks of some debtor countries in the 1930s, the creditor—country
banks did not then hold enough sovereign debt to make it a problem
for them. In the current period, there have been a few instances of
the former linkage (Argentina had domestic financial difficulties at
a critical juncture in its debt—servicing problems). The major
effort today, with banks having assumed the credit risks formerly
borne by purchasers of sovereign bonds, is to contain any menace
this poses for the financial system.So far, direct policy
intervention by national authorities and international institutions
has succeeded almost entirely in protecting the banking system from
major harm.
(II) There have been no bank failures so spectacular as
themselves to provoke debt default.
65(III) In the 1930s, withdrawals of short—term funds sometimes
brought the authorities to restrict convertibility in order to avoid
debt default. Recently, exchange—rate overvaluation without
exchange controls has brought capital flight, which has played a
greater role in the buildup to debt crisis than in the earlier
period (although capital movements were important in the propagation
of crises in both periods). Failure to block thislinkagehas been
a key weakness in present—day arrangements relative to those of the
1930s. There is a further, indirect linkage from exchange—market
disturbances to debt—servicing difficulties which is a major threat
today: exchange—rate misalignments have caused pressures for
protectionist trade policies, which impede the ability of debtor
countries to earn the export surpluses they require.
(Iv) Whereas debt default did not generally force down the
debtor's exchange rate in the 193C)s, the burden of debt service has
clearly had that effect even for non—defaulting debtors today.
Pressures from the government budget and the need to run current
account surpluses both work in this direction, insofar as
depreciation relieves the financial burden of supporting an
overvalued rate while raising net exports.
(v) Instability in the foreign exchange markets was amajor
cause of generalized financial instability in the 1930s. In the
recent period, it has endangered banks only insofar as some of
them have sought too aggressively to profit from speculation in
these markets.
(VI)In the earlier period, bank failures caused pressures on
the home country's currency by provoking capital flight, and
66occasionally on the currency of a major foreign creditor (recall how
the pound weakened due to the problems of Austrian and (3-erman
banks). Recently, tremors in the US banking system appear to have
made the foreign exchange markets nervous, but this has not been a
significant consideration.
Institutional Change and Public Policy
Partly in reaction to the problems faced by the banks,
international credit flows have in the past few years shifted
from bank lending towards direct credit markets. Simultaneously,
there has been an explosion of new financial markets and financial
instruments, primarily because technological innovation has
substantially reduced transactions costs.58
In principle, reduction in interbank linkages should reduce
systemic vulnerability. The "Cross Report" (Bank for International
Settlements, 1986), however, points out some countervailing aspects
of recent trends: the quality of banks' loan assets may decline; the
narrower base of the system may make it less reponsive to sudden
liquidity needs; non—bank capital markets may have less information
on borrowers, less opportunity to screen and to monitor performance,
and less capacity to arrange refinancing packages for those in debt—
servicing difficulties; and many of the new services banks are
providing appear to be underpriced, so that they are not providing
earnings commensurate with their risks.
These trade—offs are complicated, and the pace of change has
been so rapid that there is little contemporary experience from
which to generalize. On the basis of interwar experience, these
67developments appear to be mainly positive from the viewpoint of
financial stability. Our study of linkages suggests thatincomplete
and imperfect information favors the generalization of adverse
shocks into full—fledged crises; that macroeconomicinstability is
the prime source of those shocks; and that appropriate actionby the
regulatory and monetary authorities can block the most dangerous
linkages. Such action in the "debt strategy" has avoided defaults
and widespread bank failures to date. But it was thesystem of bank
lending to sovereign borrowers that permitted the accumulation of
excessive debt burdens, and the rescheduling process which hasso
far prevented defaults is maintaining almost the fullweight of
those burdens on the debtors.
In the 1930s, as during the century of international lending
before World War I, creditors tooassumedashare of the losses
created by adverse shocks. The problem then was that when the
shocks were global, the contagious, infectious nature of default
contributed to financial crisis, disrupting the allocative
mechanisms of the international capital market. We now have much
more sophisticated public health measures, both macroeconomic and
regulatory. They can cope with the dangers of securitization while
thefinancialsystem switches from relationship— towards
transaction—based banking.
Securitization will get more information into the market place.
This should reduce adverse selection; substitute morefreciuent,
smaller, visible shocks for the major upheavals which arise when
relationships go wrong; and remove from the banking system the heavy
burden of having to act as a buffer when shocks do occur. It isnot
68evident that underpricing of new financial services exceeds the
inadequacy of spreads in allowing for the default risk on bank
lending to sovereign borrowers in the 1970s ("disaster myopia");
while the ex—post rates of return on international lending of the
1920s appear to have been relatively favorable for the lenders.59
Calls for more formal international—lender—of—last—resort
(ILLR) arrangements6° should not obscure the substantial development
of both domestic and international LLR facilities over the past
fifty years, as well as a much more sophisticated regulatory system.
In the 1930s, financial weakness affected mainly the large banks in
Europe, while in the United States it characterized the entire
spectrum of the banking system. Now small banks are protected on
the liability side by deposit insurance which limits runs,61 and
large ones in difficulty are handled directly by domestic LLRs.
Internationally, the "Paris Club" arrangements have for over two
decades effectively handled rescheduling of official or government—
guaranteed lending to sovereign debtors. The International Monetary
Fund acts in a signalling capacity, providing the capital market
with information on debtors and so reducing the risk that the
difficulties of one will he transmitted infectiously to others who
are creditworthy. IMF conditionality helps to maintain the standing
of the debtor and its obligations, thereby limiting the risk of
contagious transmission of financial illness to its creditors. And
in contrast with the 1 930s, the IMF can act to promote a
rescheduling before default, whereas then default was needed to
provoke direct negotiations between a sovereign debtor and
representatives of its creditors.62 This ex ante bargaining should
69in principle benefit both creditors and debtors; inpractice, who
gains how much from rescheduling is highly controversial.
Coordination of prudential supervision has taken place
primarily under the auspices of the Bank for International
Settlements. The Basle concordat of 1975, as revised in1983,
explicitly disclaims any ILLR responsibilities. The authorities'
key principle is to exercise supervision on a consolidated basis.
They do have a clear understanding of how responsibilitiesare
shared between home and host central banks, and the individual
regulatory authorities are much more experienced than they were
fifty years ago. It has been difficult for them, however, tokeep
abreast of internationalization and financial innovation.
The key problem facing any LLR is moral hazard.62a The classic
answer is that the LLR is responsible for the money supply —
avoidingfinancial crisis by containing any threat to the credit
base —ratherthan for the survival of any particular financial
institution. The internationalization of the interhank market has
made this distinction harder to maintain, however, andno authority
or institution currently has responsibility for the worldmoney
supply. There is no true ILLR, although the functions whichone
might fulfil are much better understood now than they would have
been in the 1930s (as can equally be said of domestic LLRs).
Nevertheless, success in blocking the transmission of
destabilizing shocks in the 1980s owes much to the ILLR—style
activities of certain participants. The US Federal ReserveBoard
and Treasury sometimes seem to forget that the UnitedStates is
supposed to have lost its hegemonic role. Whether by itself,as
70when domestic monetary policy was eased in autumn 1982 in response
to signs of financial distress,62b or in collaboration with the IMF,
notably in dealing with Mexico in both 1982 and 1986, or
coordinating its major Western partners, as at the Plaza Hotel in
1985, the United States has shown itself capable of leadership.
Neither the commitment to "hands—off" economic policies nor the
decline of internationalism in the United States has inhibited
decisive action when American vital interests are at stake.
Sometimes others play this role, as did the (overnor of the
Bank of England in arranging a bridging loan for Hungary through the
BIS in spring 1982. Yet unless and until more formal institutional
arrangements are established, the United States will continue to be
the key player —ifit wishes —inforcing action on debt strategy,
exchange rates and macroeconomic policy coordination, and hence in
preventing financial crisis.
ITI. The Future
There are still plausible disaster scenarios. Marris (1985) on
macro policy imbalances and their consequences (the "hard landing")
and Lever and Huhne (1985) on debt both permit the imagination to
run to deep financial crisis. We believe, however, that greater
understanding today of the linkages in financial crisis may have
helped to reduce the danger of a serious crisis. Market
participants and policy—makers may have learned from the experience
of several smaller disturbances since the early 1970s that disaster
probabilities are not negligible and appropriate precautions should
be taken.
71The main dangers lie not in disturbances originating in
financial markets but in malfunctions of the realeconomy. Even
though we have not experienced a crisis that seriously disrupted its
allocative role, the international capital market still does not
appear to be working properly, with the bulk of net flows now going
from areas of high real marginal productivity to areas of lower
productivity. Sustained high unemployment still fosters
protectionism and threatens trade policy conflicts, with the
"inward—looking" consequences characteristic of the 1930s.63
Although there has been more international macroeconomic policy
cooperation recently, it is not fully institutionalized and may
prove transient64 —thereis no international monetary constitution
providing rules on exchange—market intervention and choice of
reserve asset, constraints on fiscal and monetary policies, or
responsibility for the ILLR function. Policy—makers still try to
maintain their autonomy in an increasingly interdependent world.
Paradoxically, even that objective, in the sense of expanding their
opportunity set, might best be achieved through international
economic policy coordination. Markets could not do the job, even if
individual domestic policies were independently "optimal".
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have contrasted the international financial
crisis of the 1930s with the recent performance of the global
financial system. We have sought to provide a perspectiveon the
prospects for continued stability in international capital markets.
While exhibiting fundamental differences in the operation of these
72markets currently and during the 1930s, our analysis nonetheless
yields conclusions regarding conditions conducive to both the
maintenance of stability and the onset of crisis.
The most important of these conclusions concern the roles of'
regulatory and stabilization policies. Financial crises spread most
quickly when information is least complete, and they result in major
externalities for particular sectors and the macroeconomy. On both
imperfect information and externality grounds, there is a rationale
for government intervention. Financial crises pose a greater threat
under some institutional configurations than others. Even when the
benefits of financial deregulation are apparent, there is a role for
regulatory policy in channeling financial innovation in directions
that leave the world economy less vulnerable to financial collapse.
Finally, we have seen that financial crises are as much the result
of macroeconomic shocks as they are of perturbations originating in
financial markets. Perhaps the most important policy to prevent
financial crises is therefore to provide a stable —and,in an
increasingly interdependent world, internationally coordinated —
macroeconomicenvironment within which financial markets may
function.
The main difference between now and fifty years ago is that
we haveleen therebefore and do not want to return. Informed
policies can help us to avoid epidemic and keep our anatomy
lesson to the conference room rather than the mortuary.
73FOOTNOTES
1.The most comprehensive recent survey is by Kindleberger
(1978).
2.This same point is made by Goldsmith (1982),p.42.
3. Other exchanges, including those of Italy, theNetherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Japan, Argentina and Brazil, remained stableeven at war'send.
4.See the introduction to Eichengreen (1985a) fordetails.
5.Documentingthe franc's undervaluation isproblematic, however;see Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1986). Conventional accounts
typically suggest that the franc was some 1 0 to 1 5per cent
undervalued relative to the dollar.
6.The transition from the gold to thegold—exchange standard is
analyzed in Eichengreen (1985b). We return below to the roleof
foreign deposits.
6a. Two views of the policy coordinationproblem are Clarke (1967)
and Eichengreen (1985h).
7.The information summarized here is taken fromEichengreen and Fortes (1986).
8. The parallels between the two experiencesare explored by Balogh and Graham (1979).
9. Many articles in the financialpress could be cited. An
example is the Financial Times (18 December 1929), whicheven at
this late date calls Peru "apparentlya country with a bright future."
10.See for example Winkler (1933) or Securities andExchange Commission (1937). Mintz (1950, ch.4)presents evidence that a few
aggressive issue houses were responsible for a disproportionate
share of the loans which ultimately went intodefault.
lOa. The Table 2 data on ratios of public debtto GNP must be
interpreted with care, since the importance of state andmunicipal
borrowing varied enormously across countries. The low ratiofor
Germany, for example, reflects the tendency forborrowing to
originate with municipalities and not the Reich.
11. Latin American experience is described inEichengreen (1986) and Central European reforms in Nurkse (1946).
12. League of Nations (1931), p.14.
13. Details are to be found in Schedvin (1970).
14. Schedvin (1970), pp.166—167.
7L15. Insofar as exchange—rate fluctuations due to devaluation
disrupted trade, a linkage to which contemporaries attached much
importance, export receipts and debt capacity were reduced still
further. For example, Condliffe (1933, p.221) writes that
"exchange instability resulting from the breakdown of the
international gold standard was one of the principal causes of
further economic deterioration in 1932 and figured prominently
among the factors which limited and checked the revival of prices
and productive capacity in the third quarter of that year." For
similar comments, see Nurkse (1944). We return below to evidence on
the impact of exchange—rate volatility on trade.
16. This periodization follows Condliffe (1933), chapter IX.
17. The situation in 1931 differs from Sachs's (1982) description
of pre—World—War—I lending and default. Before World War I, Sachs
argues, default by one country did little to interrupt the flow of
capital to other borrowers. The difference between the periods may
be that default in 1931 was seen as a response to global rather than
country—specific shocks.
18. Eichengreen and Portes (1986) report regressions in which both
the extent of terms—of—trade deterioration and the growth of the
central government budget deficit are significantly correlated with
the incidence and extent of default.
19. British Public Record Office (PRO) F0371/14198, Dispatch to
Foreign Office by R.C. Mitchell, "Political Situation in Bolivia,"
22 September 1930.
20. PRO F0371/14253, Dispatch from Mr. Gurney (Lima), "Annual
Report of the Peruvian President to Congress," 18 September 1930;
Madden et al. (1937), p.111.
21. Bank Commissioner of the State of Vermont (1930). Vermont
appears to be the only state for which this information is
available. See White (1984) for further discussion of these data.
22. See Leguizamon (1933) for additional analysis.
23. Kindleberger (1984), p.372.It is popularly thought that
origins of the run were both economic, caused by the bank's
uncertain liquidity, and political, caused by French alarm over the
recently proposed Austro—German customs union.
24. A recent account of this episode is James (1984).
25. It could be argued that the provision of deposit insurance and
improvements in bank regulation have reduced the extent of these
externalities. We return to this point below.
26. See League of' Nations (1934) for another statement of this
view.
27. Details are to be found in Cairncross and Bichengreen (1983)
-'5and the references cited there.
28. Between June 1922 and June 1929, the realestate loans of
commercial banks had risen by 128per cent and their security loans
by 77 per cent, in comparison with all other loans andinvestments, which rose by only 50 per cent.
29.The ratio of cash reserves to totaldeposits was consistently
lower only in countries which ultimately turnedto exchange control
(Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia) and in theexceptional Swedish case.
30. This is similar to the argument advancedby Bernanke (1985).
31 .Thisepisode is the subject of Epstein and Ferguson (1984).
32. Beenstock (1984) argues that this difference hasno significant
systemic consequences; and the 1970smay turn out to have beena
quite exceptional period in this regard, with thegrowth of
securitization and off—balance--sheet operations in thepast few years.
33. There were negotiations between debtor countriesand the
bondholders' organizations after the defaults of the1930s, but they were difficult to organize. See Eichengreen andPortes (1986).
34. See Williamson (1977) for an account of thisperiod.
35. See Padoa—Schioppa's essay (1985) forbackground on the
operation of the EMS and the detailed discussions andassessments in
the report (and background documents) of theTreasury and Civil Service Committee of the UKRouseof Commons (1985).
36. The studies which supposedly showed theinefficacy of
sterilized intervention were ignored when the UnitedStates changed its policy stance in September 1985.
37. Recent accounts, from somewhat differentviewpoints, include Cline (1984) and Lever and Huhne (1985).
38.OECD (1983) describes the picture at thebeginning of the
1980s, and Bryant (1986) offers a more recent andmore analytical assessment.
39.See Kindleberger (1978, 1986).
40. Generally, capital controls have beenprogressively liberalized or removed, notably in the UK. It can he argued thatthey have played an important role in keeping the EMS together—orthat the
demands of keeping the system together haverequired capital
controls (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1986). Thisview is likely to be tested soon, as France and Italyproceed to relax exchange controls.
41. See Kenen and Rodrik (1986).
7642. See Rogoff(1985), Padoa—Schioppa (1985), House ofCommons
(1985).
43. See de Grauwe and de Bellefroid (1986) and Kenen and Rodrik
(1986).
44. See Frankel and Froot (1986) and references cited there.
45. The estimates in World Financial Markets (March 1986) are
particularly striking, though controversial (according to the
Financial Times 21 August 1986, the Bank of Mexico estimates capital
flight under the current governnent at $2 billion, in contrast to
the Morgan Guaranty estimate of $17 billion). A more academic but
still debatable analysis stressing the role of capital flight in
Latin American debt problems, and the root cause of exchange rate
overvaluation, is given by Sachs (1985).
46. The view of Marris (1985) are discussed below.
47. Diaz—Alejandro (1984) argues that an observer in 1980—81 could
not reasonably have foreseen a crisis of the magnitude experienced
in 1982—84. On the other hand, Portes (1977) predicted a debt—
servicing crisis for several East European countries in the early
1980s, beginning with a rescheduling for Poland in 1980—81.
48. See Fortes (1982).
49. World Bank (1986).
50. As suggested by theory; see, for example, Guttentag and
Herring (1984). Their argument that an extended period without
adverse shocks creates conditions in which a shock will then provoke
discontinuous market behaviour is more specific and rigorous than
the "financial instability hypothesis" of Minsky (1982), who argues
that the danger of financial crisis builds up over an extended
period of prosperous times.
51 .Cf.footnote 18 above.
52. See Cohen (1985).
53. Notable among these are Kraft (1984), who gives an "inside",
circumstantial narrative of the neotiations which dealt with the
initial Mexican crisis, and Fraga (1986), who makes an interesting
comparison of Brazil's recent experience with Germany and
reparations fifty years before.
54. Compare Guttentag and Herring (1985) with Edwards (1986).
55. "With reasonable recovery in the global economy, the problem
of international debt should prove manageable and the decree of its
current risk to the international system should decline (Cline,
1983, p. 121)."
56. See Kaletsky (1985) and Lever and Huhne (1985).
7757. SeeEichengreen and Fortes (1986) for calculations ofthe
ex—post rates of return earned bycreditorsin such cases.
58. Cooper (1986) describes these changes and argues convincingly
that they are explained better by technical change than as
innovative risk—sharing arrangements or as responses to cross—
border differences in taxation and regulation.
59.Eichengreenand Fortes (1986).
60. For example, see Guttentag and Herring (1983).
61 .Themodels of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation have been
increasingly followed in Furope and elsewhere.
62. Eichengreen and Fortes (1986).
62a. Solow (1982) provides a recent discussion of the theory
relevant to LL functions, which are treated further in Kindleberger
(1978) and Kindleberger and Laffargue (1982).Tt can be argued that
financial deregulation has led to more risk—taking by financial
intermediaries, hence to more LLR intervention, exacerbating moral
hazard (and weakening monetary control). Thisgoes beyond our scope here.
62b. See Carron (1982).
63. See Cooper (1983).
64. See Fortes (1986).
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